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Abstract
This dissertation focuses on the mortgage default behavior and the valuation of
distressed properties. Three essays are included.
The first essay uses New Orleans foreclosure data, where each property has
three appraisals, to investigate the factors affecting appraisal bias and accuracy,
and to estimate the magnitude of appraisal accuracy for distressed properties.
Our main finding is that the relation between the client and the appraiser affects
valuation bias. Customer employed appraisers tend to give client friendly valuation
than their court appointed counterpart. Experienced and licensed appraisers render
less biased valuations; while appraisers specializing in lenders tend to give lender
friendly valuation. Experienced and licensed appraisers also have more accurate
valuation.
The second essay conducts loan-level analysis to investigate the influence of
expected foreclosure delay on a borrower’s default propensity. The paper includes
the actual foreclosure times in the analysis which also captures the dynamic nature
of foreclosure duration over time. We document the increase in foreclosure duration
in recent years. Consistent with the prediction of theory, we find a statistically and
economically significant impact of foreclosure delay on borrower default behavior.
The results are robust to various specifications such as state fixed effects, different
measures for delays, and year fixed effects. For high initial combined loan-to-value
ratio mortgages, the increase in delay has stronger impact on default and the effect
is consistent across various loan types and borrowers with different credit scores.
Expectations of housing prices play an important role in real estate research.
Despite their importance, obtaining a reasonable proxy for such expectations is a
v
challenge. The third essays proposes to use the transaction prices of Case-Shiller
housing futures as an alternative “forward-looking” proxy. We compare the per-
formances of four different expectation proxies in explaining borrower mortgage
default behavior. The loan level analysis shows that the futures based proxy out-
performs other measures by having the highest regression model fit as well as being
the only measure that shows a significant negative effect on mortgage default be-
havior. In addition, the paper shows that futures contain additional information
that is not present in the past housing prices.
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Chapter 1
Distressed Properties: Valuation Bias
and Accuracy
1.1 Introduction
In the current real estate crisis the value of the collateral underlying mortgages
has become critical information. Activities such as refinancing, loan modification,
and mortgage pricing depend on estimates of value, most commonly supplied by
appraisers. Appraisers play an important role in safeguarding the integrity of the
housing finance system. Despite their importance, it is difficult to measure their
performances, since appraisers usually know the contract price for the property
prior to rendering their own estimate of value and this affects their incentives
(Chinloy, Cho, and Megbolugbe, 1997).
However, in some cases appraisal accuracy is quantifiable. For example, Dotzour
(1988) examines the accuracy of appraisals done for home relocation companies.
These appraisals are done prior to the sales contract. Impressively, appraisers with
professional designations could display a standard deviation of error of less than
three percent. In the context of commercial appraisal, Graff and Young (1999) find
that having multiple appraisals allowed quantification of appraisal accuracy. An
unbiased appraisal consists of the true value plus random appraisal error. Given
multiple unbiased appraisals, one can solve for the magnitude of the appraisal
accuracy.
Another situation that results in multiple appraisals is found in the foreclosure
process. For example, the foreclosure process in Louisiana often results in three
contemporaneous appraisals for each property. Since some characteristics of the
clients and the appraisers as well as the neighborhood information of the property
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are known, this permits investigation of factors that lead to biases in appraisals
as well as factors that affect the accuracy of appraisals. The existence of various
factors have been discussed in the literature, but obtaining a large number of
observations is usually difficult. Much of the valuation literature uses experiment
or the survey method to study appraiser behavior. Amidu, Aluko, and Hansz (2008)
provide an excellent recent review of much of this valuation literature. In contrast to
the small samples often encountered in valuation research, this study of foreclosure
data from New Orleans involves 1, 532 properties, each with three appraisals.
A simple unconditional analysis of these data shows a systematic downward bias
for lender appraisals and an upward bias for borrower appraisals. However, much
of the unconditional bias is explained by various factors. For example, experienced
and licensed appraisers (LA) show lower biases. Real estate agents (RS) exhibit
an upward bias. Lender specialized appraisers tends to increase biases in favor of
the lenders. In addition, court appointed (CA) appraisers exhibit less systematic
biases than their customer employed (CE) counterparts. Little systematic bias is
associated with various types of demographic and economic variables such as race,
income, owner occupied status, and population in the area around the property. In
addition, there appear to be little spatial or temporal dependence in the residuals,
thus indicating that the appraisers have largely incorporated this information into
their valuations.
Also, the analysis examined factors that affect the accuracy of the appraisals
(after allowing for the biases). Specifically, appraiser experience and licensing sig-
nificantly reduce the variance of the appraisal errors. Again, demographic and
economic variables pertaining to property and individuals in the area do not affect
appraisal accuracy.
2
The accuracy of valuations on distressed properties could have a material impact
on a number of potential policies. First, various proposals (Levitin , 2009) have
been made to reduce the principal on distressed properties to their “market value.”
This tacitly assumes that accurate estimation of market value is feasible for dis-
tressed properties. Second, the Obama Mortgage Plan, more formally termed the
2009 Home Affordable Modification Program, has eligibility requirements with the
provision that borrowers must not owe more than 125 percent of the house value
(Housing and Urban Development, 2009). Again, the policy depends upon valua-
tion of distressed property. Third, recent changes resulting in the Home Valuation
Code of Conduct (Freddie Mac, 2009) may have the effect of changing appraiser
characteristics such as experience and compensation which may affect both the bias
and variance of valuations. The Home Valuation Code of Conduct promotes the
use of Appraisal Management Companies (AMC) which may hire inexperienced
appraisers that are not familiar with the area. This could result in an increased
incidence of inaccurate appraisals.
In addition, appraisal bias and accuracy naturally affect the valuation and orig-
ination of loans. For a seasoned loan a liberal appraisal of the collateral (appraisal
greater than value) means that the true loan-to-value ratio is higher and there-
fore the loan is riskier and worth less than anticipated under a known value of
the property. A conservative appraisal (appraisal less than value) means the true
loan-to-value ratio is lower and therefore the loan is worth more than anticipated.
Given the non-linear nature of loans (when viewed as options), the former effect is
more serious than the latter and therefore inaccurate appraisals can have a detri-
mental effect on portfolio valuation. From a loan origination standpoint, inaccurate
appraisals often lead to a breakdown in a potential sale. Consequently, some un-
3
derstanding of the sources of bias and error in appraisals could aid valuation and
origination of real estate loans and associated portfolios.
We go into the specific analysis in Section 1.2 and discuss more of the implica-
tions of this research in the conclusion.
1.2 New Orleans Foreclosure Appraisals
We examine foreclosure appraisals in New Orleans from 2003 until Katrina in
September 2005 for factors underlying appraisal bias and accuracy. In section 1.2.1
we provide the setting and rules pertinent to foreclosure appraisals. In section 3.2.1
we cover the specifics of the foreclosure data. In section 1.2.3 we set forth the speci-
fications and techniques used in investigating bias and accuracy. In section 1.2.4 we
look into the factors behind bias and their magnitudes. In section 1.2.5 we derive
an estimate of appraiser accuracy. In section 1.2.6 we investigate how appraiser
characteristics affect appraisal error.
1.2.1 Institutional Background
Most foreclosure proceedings in Louisiana involve three appraisals of the property.
Although the individuals conducting the valuations need not be licensed, each in-
dividual takes an oath to make a true and just appraisal of the property.1 Both the
lender and borrower can select their own appraisers. If a party does not select an
appraiser, the court will appoint an appraiser to represent that party. In addition,
there is a referee who provides another valuation. Although, if the appraisals from
the borrower and lender appraisals differ by less than 10 percent, the referee ap-
praisal is simply the average of the lender and borrower appraisals. The minimum
sales price (or the starting bid) at the foreclosure auction is 2/3 of the referee’s
1Since the law uses the term appraisal, but does not require state licensing, we will use the terms appraisal
and valuation synonymously.
4
valuation. The Sheriff’s office receives a three percent sales commission. In many
cases the appraiser can only examine the exterior of the property.
Borrowers have an incentive to maximize the sales price as it reduces the amount
of a possible deficiency judgment. Lenders have a minor incentive to reduce the
sales price which will reduce the commission. Almost always, the lender is the
successful bidder at the foreclosure auction. Regardless of the price paid at the
auction, this will not change the price the lender realizes in a subsequent sale of the
property. However, if a lender pays a high price for the property at the foreclosure
sale, it reduces the possible deficiency judgment that they could collect. Obtaining
the property at a low sales price at the auction may provide a timing option on
when to realize gains or losses which could prove beneficial for accounting or tax
reasons.
1.2.2 Data
We purchase the data in electronic form from the Orleans Parish Civil Sheriff’s
office. The files contain observations from 2000 through 2008. Before 2003 the fields
for distinguishing between court appointed and customer employed appraisers do
not appear in the data. Therefore, we limit our data from 2003 until Katrina hit
in September of 2005. The specialization variable and the experience variable are
based on two prior years of data. So for the purposes of computing specialization
and experience, we also employ data from 2001 and 2002.
The post Katrina period was quite chaotic (Lam et al., 2009). Many of the fore-
closed structures were damaged. Also, the voluntary moratoriums on foreclosures
meant that many properties stayed unrepaired and subject to the elements for
a long period. To avoid confounding many of the Katrina effects with a normal
foreclosure market, we stop our data collection at the date of Katrina.
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We have some elementary screening of the data. Specifically, we require valid
lender, borrower, and referee appraisal amounts for each property. We also exclude
low value properties with appraisals of under $10, 000 and potential commercial
properties with appraisals of over $500, 000. Totally 78 observations are deleted
because of extreme values and our final sample size is 1, 532.
We measure appraiser experience by the logged number of appraisals performed
for foreclosure properties in the last two years by the appraiser and measure spe-
cialization in clients by the proportion of appraisals done for lenders in the previous
two years. We obtain names for the appraisers and check the Louisiana Real Estate
Appraisers Board, Louisiana Real Estate Commission and Louisiana State Bar As-
sociation to see if they are licensed appraisers or real estate agents. The binary
variables LA and RS equal one if the appraiser is a licensed real estate appraiser
or real estate agent, and zero otherwise. Our sample represents 105 individual ap-
praisers. Out of the 105 appraisers, 55 are licensed appraisers, six are real estate
agents and 49 do not appear to have any professional designations. The variable
CE is also binary which equals to one for customer employed appraisals and zero
otherwise. The summary statistics for these variables appear in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1 shows a number of patterns. First, the lender mean appraisal is lower
than the referee appraisal, while the borrower appraisal is higher than the referee
appraisal. All three appraisals are significantly different from each other at the
one percent level for both mean and median pairwise comparisons. Much of these
differences are due to various systematic effects examined later in this paper.
Second, lenders tend to employ their own appraisers more often than the bor-
rower (CE as opposed to CA). Lenders employ appraisers around 1/4 of the time
while borrowers employ appraisers less than nine percent of the time. Given the
lender’s motivation favoring lower appraisals, a natural question is why lenders
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do not always hire their own appraisers. One potential explanation is that the fee
charged by the CA appraiser is less than the CE appraiser and the fee should be
paid by the lender. Additionally when the appraisal difference between lender and
borrower is greater than ten percent, the court will order another appraisal which
is used to calculate the starting bid, and this could limit the potential benefit of
CE appraisals.2
Third, appraisers tend to specialize by client. Lender appraisers work for lender
about 65 percent of the time, while borrower appraisers work for lender only around
17 percent of the time and referee appraisers work for lender for less than seven
percent of the time. Fourth, a greater portion of licensed appraisers work for the
lender than for the borrower and the court. Fifth, lenders and borrowers have more
experienced appraisers than the court.
TABLE 1.1. Summary Statistics
Lender Borrower Referee
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Appraisal ($1000) 78.6104 60.6711 87.4943 64.2396 84.1740 62.5927
Experience 5.4985 2.0649 5.5747 1.1930 2.3220 2.6170
Specialization 0.6539 0.2949 0.1656 0.2260 0.0699 0.2230
LA 0.5979 0.4905 0.1116 0.3150 0.1090 0.3118
RS 0.0124 0.1107 0.0437 0.2046 0.0868 0.2817
CE 0.2435 0.4293 0.0881 0.2836
1.2.3 Models
The most straightforward way of measuring appraisal accuracy would be to com-
pare an appraised value with a subsequent transaction price. However, for houses
2Also, the data shows that on average the referee appraisal carries a higher value for lender customer employed
properties than for lender court appointed properties. This may create a potential selection bias issue. However,
we perform a Probit analysis of CE choice using referee appraised value as an explanatory variable. The regression
was insignificant. Therefore, we conclude that the potential selection bias does not pose a serious problem.
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involved in foreclosure this is difficult since the winning bid is often the minimum
set by law (in this case 2/3 of the referee appraisal value). By bidding the minimum
amount the lender reduces the small commission paid on foreclosure sales and in-
creases the potential judgment. However, the lender typically has an interest that
exceeds the market value and could easily bid this amount. Neither the minimum
bid nor the interest the lender has in the property are necessarily equal to mar-
ket value. For example, Pennington-Cross (2006) argues that the auction price of
forclosed property is significantly lower than the market value. Usually, the lender
acquires the property and may later repair the property in order to sell it. None
of these expenditures are observable. Consequently, measuring appraisal accuracy
using foreclosure transaction price or using a subsequent sale of the property by
the lender would not prove very informative.
A few equations help motivate an improved procedure. Let P̂
(o)
i represent the
appraised value of the ith property conducted by the oth party (L for lender, B for
borrower, and R for referee). The appraised value is a combination of client char-
acteristics measured by c
(o)
i , with parameter γ, appraiser characteristics measured
by x
(o)




i , and an unobservable variable µi. The unobservable variable µi
captures all the variation across properties not measured by census variables and
appraiser and client characteristics in this model. Since property specific charac-
teristics is not included in the observable variables, µi is likely to be large and





i γ + x
(o)
i β + ziθ
(o) + µi + ε
(o)
i (1.1)
o = L, B, R, i = 1 . . . n (1.2)
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Because µi can be large and correlated with observable variables, we use differ-
encing to eliminate the unobservable or latent values associated with each property.
This removes a source of bias (omitted variable bias) and greatly reduces the esti-
mated error of the regression.
ln P̂
(o)










i )β + zi(θ
(o) − θ(p)) + ε(o)i − ε
(p)
i(1.3)
y = Cδγ +Xδβ + Zθδ + εδ (1.4)
For unbiased appraisals, each appraisal consists of the underlying µi plus a ran-
dom error component. In this case, all the estimated coefficients of the model
would not be significantly different from 0. In addition, the disturbances would
not display any dependence over space or time. If the appraisals from the various
sources were unbiased, they would all have the same mean for a common group
of properties. However, we observe that the means vary across groups from the
summary statistics. This suggests that the differences in means across groups may
come from incentives and other factors. Given appraisers face varying incentives,
we specify some of these incentives as in appraiser characteristics Xδ,
Xδ =
[
Experienceδ Specializationδ LAδ RSδ
]
(1.5)
where Xδ contains the differences in variables as specified in (1.3) so that Experienceδ
represents the differences between the logs of the number of appraisals performed
by the respective appraisers, Specializationδ equals the difference in specialization
in lender between the two appraisers, the variables LAδ and RSδ take on values
of −1, 0, 1 as these are differenced binary variables. Client characteristics variable
is captured by the variable CE. The differencing variable CEδ also takes value of
−1, 0, 1.
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First, inexperienced appraisers without much volume of business may need to pay
more attention to the client objectives than experienced appraisers, which may lead
to more bias. We hypothesize that the coefficient on the variable Experienceδ will be
positive for individuals conducting lender appraisals and negative for individuals
conducting borrower appraisals versus referee appraisals. For the lender versus
borrower regression, we anticipate a positive coefficient for Experienceδ.
Second, appraisers who specialize in performing appraisals for clients may tend
to provide appraisals that match the clients’ desire. This could either be the out-
come of slanting appraisals in favor of the client or the result of client selection
of appraisers who tend to render valuations that favor the client. Therefore, we
hypothesize that the variable Specializationδ will have negative coefficients.
Third, professional designations represent a form of reputation capital and so,
relative to unlicensed individuals, we expect that licensed appraisers would be more
likely to provide a higher appraisal to lenders (positive sign) and a lower appraisal
to borrowers (negative sign). The same could hold true to a lesser extent for real
estate agents. For the lender versus borrower regression, we anticipate positive
coefficients for LAδ and RSδ.
Fourth, clients pay more to hire their own appraisers and have a motivation to
get more favorable valuation. They may put pressure on the appraisers to adjust
their valuation. Client selected appraisers may respond to the client pressure by
issuing more client favorable valuations than court appointed appraisers. we expect
the coefficient of CEδ is negative for L B and L R regressions and positive for B R
regressions.
Appraisals could be affected by neighborhood characteristics as well. We specify




Land Pop Black Income HousePrice Owner ιn
]
where zi is the ith row of Z, Land is land area, Pop is total population, Black is
black population, Income is median household income, HousePrice is the median
house price, Owner is units of owner-occupied housing, and ιn is a n by 1 vector of
ones representing the constant term. All of these variables (except ιn) are logged
and are tract level from the 2000 Census.
More populous, higher income, higher priced neighborhoods with a higher amount
of owner occupied homes may be easier to value. In this case, the difference between
the various appraisals could narrow. Racial aspects of real estate finance have been
of interest for many years so we included a variable measuring black population. In
addition, we include a variable that gives the land area of the census tract. Given
the log specification, this allows interpretation of the other variables in terms of
density.
1.2.4 Appraisal Bias
We estimate the specifications in (1.3) using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Ta-
ble 1.2 reports the regression results of the various combinations of appraisal
contrasts or differences. Regression one examines the difference between lender
appraisals versus the borrower appraisals, regression two examines the lender ap-
praisals versus the referee appraisals and regression three examines the borrower
appraisals versus the referee appraisals.
Since lender appraisals on average are lower than both borrower and referee
appraisals, the logged appraisal difference as the dependent variable is negative
at mean for regression one and two. Thus for regression one and two, variables
with negative coefficients increase the bias while variables with positive coefficients
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reduce the bias. Similarly, since borrower appraisals on average are higher than the
referee appraisals, for regression three, variables with negative coefficients decrease
the bias while variables with positive coefficients increase the bias. The results
show that experienced and licensed appraisers act to significantly counteract bias
in favor of the client. For example, the ratio of lender appraisal divided by borrower
appraisal rendered by licensed appraisers is on average 2.19% (e0.0217−1 = 0.0219)
higher than by the nonlicensed appraisers. Appraisers that specialize in working
for lenders tend to provide appraisals that appear slanted in favor of lender. Real
estate agents tend to value property higher for both the borrower and the lender.
Customer selected appraisers give more favorable valuation to the clients than
court appointed appraisers. For example, the ratio of lender appraisal divided by
borrower appraisal rendered by customer employed appraisers is on average 4.24%
(e−0.0443 − 1 = −0.0424) lower than by the their court appointed counterparts.
Typically, the census variables are not both statistically significant and large
in magnitude. In particular, the racial variable is not statistically significant in
any of the regressions. The constant term shows a pattern with lenders showing
a more negative intercept than the corresponding borrower regression. However,
the differences in the constants are not significantly different. Therefore, the var-
ious appraiser characteristic variables seem to have accounted for a large part of
the unconditional bias shown in the lender and borrower appraisals. Finally, the
residuals do not show spatial or temporal dependence (LeSage and Pace, 2009)
which indicates that appraisers largely remove the signal from the data which left
only noise. In other words, appraisers (after allowing for various biases) largely
incorporate the neighborhood information in valuations.
After controlling for the various biases affecting appraisals, we turn our attention
to estimates of appraisal accuracy and the factors affecting accuracy. However, it
12














CEδ −0.0443∗∗∗ −0.0322∗∗ 0.0025
(0.0158) (0.0138) (0.0100)
Land −0.0031 −0.0043 −0.0012
(0.0082) (0.0060) (0.0038)
Pop −0.0620∗∗ −0.0270 0.0128
(0.0249) (0.0181) (0.0115)
Black 0.0048 0.0014 0.0043
(0.0108) (0.0078) (0.0050)
Income −0.0279 −0.0181 0.0169
(0.0278) (0.0201) (0.0128)
HousePrice 0.0616∗∗ 0.0427∗∗ −0.0052
(0.0257) (0.0186) (0.0119)
Owner 0.0452∗ 0.0211∗ −0.0196
(0.0263) (0.0118) (0.0175)
Constant −0.3024 −0.2654 −0.0448
(0.2387) (0.1735) (0.1109)
N 1532 1532 1532
R2 0.0908 0.1798 0.0653
RMSE 0.1927 0.1400 0.0893
F 13.7996 30.2856 9.6545
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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is difficult by inspection of the differences between the borrower and referee ap-
praisals as well as between the lender and referee appraisals to assess the accuracy
of the borrower and lender appraisers since the referee has knowledge of both
appraisals before forming their opinion. Although this most likely increases the
referee accuracy, it complicates the analysis of the variance.3 To address this issue,
in the following section we examine the random appraisal error from contrasting
borrower and lender appraisals. Since borrower and lender appraisals most likely
have similar random errors (after filtering out biases), this aids in estimating the
underlying accuracy of appraisers.
1.2.5 Appraiser Accuracy
According to equation (1.3), given the borrower and lender appraisals are done







Given the further assumption that the variances of the random errors for lender
and borrower appraisers are the same yields (1.7).




The RMSE for the borrower lender contrast regression (appraisal differences fil-
tered for systematic effects) is an estimate of σε(B)−ε(L) . Therefore, from Table 1.2
regression one, we could calculate the standard deviation of the appraisal error as
3The referee valuation is thus “anchored” and this can increase error rates in some cases (Diaz and Hansz,
2001). However, given the magnitude of biases in this setting, a referee may serve a very useful role.
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√
0.5(0.1927)2 = 13.63 percent. Translated into mean absolute error (MAE) terms
the 13.63 percent standard deviation equals 10.88 percent for a normal random
variable. Note, this is just an estimate of the magnitude of the random error and
the total error involves both the random error as well as the systematic biases
described earlier.
To estimate the appraisal accuracy for unlicensed appraisers, we run lender
versus borrower regression using the subsample with both unlicensed lender and
borrower appraisers and obtain the RMSE from the regression equal to 0.2622.
This translates into the standard deviation of the unlicensed appraisal error as√
0.5(0.2622)2 = 18.54 percent, or 14.79 percent in MAE. To estimate the accu-
racy for licensed appraisers, we run the regression requiring licensed appraisers for
both lender and borrower and obtain the RMSE equal to 0.1370. This translates
into a standard deviation of the licensed appraisal error of
√
0.5(0.1370)2 = 0.0969
or 7.74 percent in MAE.
In contrast, Dotzour (1988) find that designated appraisers working for reloca-
tion companies have a MAE of 2.77 percent. This estimate of error contains both
systematic and random components. Not surprisingly, the implied accuracy on fore-
closure appraisals is far worse than on relocation properties, which are typically
well above average in quality.
Given an overall estimate of the random component of appraisal error, this raises
the question of which factors materially affect accuracy. We address this in the next
section.
1.2.6 Factors Affecting Accuracy
In this section, we investigate how the appraiser characteristics and neighborhood
characteristics affect the variances of the residuals from the differencing regressions
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in Table 1.2. According to equation (1.8), the appraisal variance could be explained
by appraiser characteristics and neighborhood characteristics.
σ̂2i,ε(o) = x
(o)
i γ + ziδ
(o) + ε
(o)
i , o = L, B (1.8)
However, we could not observe the variance of lender or borrower appraisals. But
we could use the residuals ei from regression one in Table 1.2 as the proxy for
σε(B)−ε(L) . Substituting equation (1.8) into equation (1.6) yields (1.9) which reduces
to the estimation equation (1.10). As shown in equation (1.9), Xa is the average of
borrower and lender appraiser characteristics. Thus, Experiencea, Specializationa,
LAa and RSa for the residual regression are defined as the average of lender and
borrower appraisers’ experience, specialization, LA and RS. The estimation results
appear in Table 1.3.




i )γ + 0.5zi(δ





y = Xaγ + Zδa + ε (1.10)
Table 1.3 shows that experience and licensing strongly reduce the variance of
the residuals, and real estate agents are less accurate. None of the census variables
is statistically significant.
To make this more concrete we examine specific cases in Table 1.4 to see how
the implied standard deviation and mean absolute error of appraisal error vary by
appraiser licensing and experience. We examine licensed and unlicensed appraisers
with three levels of experience (5, 50, and 250 appraisals performed for distressed
properties in the past two years) in Table 1.4. Census data and the specialization
variable are evaluated at their mean values.
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Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
TABLE 1.4. Implied Standard Deviation and Mean Absolute Error of Random Appraisal
Error For Varying Appraiser Licensing and Experience
Cases Licensed Appraiser Experience Std. Dev. MAE
1 No 5 0.2203 0.1757
2 No 50 0.1276 0.1018
3 No 250 0.0871 0.0695
4 Yes 5 0.1270 0.1013
5 Yes 50 0.0736 0.0588
6 Yes 250 0.0502 0.0401
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Table 1.4 makes the role of experience and licensing clear. Although the average
appraisal has an implied MAE of 10.88 percent, experienced licensed appraisers
can perform much better than that. In the best scenario of a very experienced
licensed appraiser as in case 6, the appraisal accuracy is 4.01 percent, slightly
higher than the relocation appraisers examined by Dotzour (1988) who have a
MAE of 2.77 percent. Going to a licensed appraiser who has done 50 appraisals
of distressed properties in the last two years raises the MAE to 5.88 percent. In
contrast, unlicensed appraisers with almost no experience can have an implied
MAE of 17.57 percent as shown in case 1.
The inaccuracy of inexperience appraisers has implications for programs rely-
ing on appraisals. Any major program that requires a large number of distressed
properties to be revalued in a short time will need to rely on inexperienced ap-
praisers to handle the workload as the number of appraisers that perform a large
number of appraisals in this specialized area is limited. However, inexperienced
appraisers will likely not perform well and this will pose a problem for programs
that assume accurate valuations are possible. Various loan modification programs
such as the Home Affordable Modification Program, the practice of “lien strip-
ping” where the principal on a second mortgage is reduced so that the principal on
both the first and second mortgages do not exceed the estimated market value (set
by appraisals), and refinancing guidelines (such as those in the Home Affordable
Modification Program) all tacitly assume that an appraiser can make an accurate
determination of market value for a distressed property.
Similarly, attempts to reduce bias in appraisal sometimes may result in lower
accuracy. The Home Valuation Code of Conduct promotes the use of Appraisal
Management Companies (AMC) which may hire inexperienced appraisers that are
not familiar with the area. In effect, an appraiser going into an unfamiliar area
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is similar to an inexperienced appraiser. This lack of experience in a particular
market could result in an increased incidence of inaccurate appraisals. Inaccurate
appraisals may cause legitimate transactions to fail and yet not detect fraudulent
transactions.
1.3 Conclusion
The relation between the client and the appraiser affects valuation bias. First,
whether the appraiser works for the court as opposed to the clients makes a differ-
ence. In the regression estimating the biases, the coefficients on variables measuring
client characteristics indicating that customer employed appraisers give more client
favorable valuations. This implies that client pressure might exist for the valuation
process. Second, individuals that specialize in lender exhibit biases in favor of the
lender. Third, appraisers with more experience may have less dependence on any
client and these appraisers show a reduction in bias in favor of the client. Fourth,
licensed individuals may have more reputation capital and thus have incentives to
resist client pressures. Licensed appraisers show a reduction in bias in favor of the
client. However, real estate agents show an upward bias relative to other individ-
uals in all cases. Many of the same factors affected valuation accuracy as well. In
particular, experience and licensing increase accuracy.
We estimate that the magnitude of the random appraisal error (as measured by
mean absolute error) is 10.9 percent for these properties, 7.7 percent for licensed
appraisers and 14.8 percent for unlicensed appraisers and the total appraisal error
(random plus systematic components) would go beyond this level. This greatly
exceeds the error found in other settings such as for relocation appraisals. The
lack of accuracy has implications for policies that rely upon real estate valuations
for principal reduction, purchase, or refinancing. For example, the 2009 Home
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Affordable Modification Program (Obama Mortgage Plan) eligibility requirements
contain the provision that borrowers must not owe more than 125 percent of the
value of home. Given the high error rate in just the random component of appraisal
error, many borrowers could either qualify or not qualify based only on appraisal
error.
Appraisal bias and accuracy naturally affect the valuation of loans. Adjustments
need to be made to models assuming a known value to account for the uncertain
value of the collateral. In areas with distressed properties, the accuracy and biases
for these appraisals may more closely resemble this foreclosure setting.
Appraisal problems affect both the purchase of housing and the refinancing of
loans. Poor appraisals can lead to cancellations of sales, loan denial, and other
problems. None of these problems helps the efficiency of the housing market.
20
Chapter 2
The Influence of Foreclosure Delays on
Borrower’s Default Behavior
2.1 Introduction
When mortgage borrowers miss their monthly payments for a certain time period,
typically after three complete missing payments, lenders may initiate the foreclo-
sure process. The conclusion of the foreclosure process is normally through the
foreclosure sale.1 The duration from the first missing payment date to the end of
the foreclosure sale represents the foreclosure delay or foreclosure duration. Dur-
ing this time period, the defaulting borrower can legally stay in the house without
making payments and enjoy “free rent.”
Recent developments such as the pressure on servicers to modify loans, foreclo-
sure moratoria on the part of states or lenders, state foreclosure mitigation efforts,
and foreclosure documentation issues have all contributed to a longer foreclosure
period. This raises the question on the sensitivity of default to such foreclosure de-
lays. If default is insensitive to foreclosure delays, increasing the foreclosure period
may provide temporary relief for defaulting borrowers and may lead to self cure of
default.2 Alternatively, if default is sensitive to foreclosure delays, increasing the
foreclosure period may compound problems in the mortgage market as it increases
incentives to default and thus makes default optimal for more borrowers.
From an option pricing perspective, rational borrowers make their decision on
default based on the expected value of default. Ambrose et al. (1997) explicitly
introduced foreclosure delays in the mortgage pricing model and provided a theo-
1Of course, there are other ways of exiting the foreclosure process. For measuring foreclosure delay, we only
consider the exit through the foreclosure sale.
2On the other hand, longer foreclosure delay may drag borrowers deeper in debt and thus make it hard to
come back to current status.
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retical basis for the effect of expected delay on the borrower’s future default propen-
sity. The theory states that longer expected foreclosure delays tend to increase the
probability of default since the “free rent” changes the threshold of whether the
default put option is “in the money” or not. However, empirical research has not
found support for foreclosure delay affecting the borrower’s default decision (e. g.
Ghent and Kudlyak, 2010). This apparent discrepancy between theory and em-
pirical evidence, and the ongoing debate on foreclosure mitigation motive us to
investigate the issue in deep.
Given the data constraints, previous studies typically include the single-year de-
lays that are based on the non-contested foreclosure process. Although this measure
might be useful to gauge the effectiveness of state foreclosure laws, it is not the
proper proxy for the borrower’s expected foreclosure duration. One reason is that
most foreclosure cases include some delays that are beyond the state specified min-
imum foreclosure times.3 For example, Pennington-Cross (2010) documented that
at individual loan level, many factors could contribute to foreclosure duration. If
borrowers base their expectation of future foreclosure duration on their observed
delay, a better measure of expected foreclosure duration should be the actual fore-
closure duration in the recent past. Another reason is, as documented later in the
paper, foreclosure durations change over time. Consequently, the single-year static
measures fail to capture the dynamic feature of the actual foreclosure duration.
Different from previous studies, this paper estimates and includes the actual
time-varying state-level foreclosure delays to proxy for borrower’s expected ben-
efits of “free rent” from default. We document the increase in foreclosure dura-
tion in recent years. Using more than four million loan-quarter observations, this
3For example, the extra delay may come from the court when the court is overburdened, or from the borrowers
when they contest the process, or from third party servicers who have different incentives from the investors or
the lenders (Levitin, 2010).
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manuscript adopts the Cox proportional model to empirically investigate the im-
pact of expected delays on borrower default propensity. Consistent with the predic-
tions of Ambrose et al. (1997) theoretical model, the results show that borrowers
who expect longer foreclosure time have a higher propensity to default.4 The im-
pact is significant both statistically and economically. The results are robust to
state fixed effects, various measures of delay, and year fixed effects. It is not driven
by a single state, nor the number of years that the loan performances are tracked.
As for the magnitude of the impact, for a three-month increase in delay, the hazard
of default on average increases by more than 30 percent, which has the equivalent
effect on default propensity as of a 11 percent increase in the current loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio or a more than 30 point decrease in Fico score. Higher initial LTV
ratio loans are more sensitive to increase in expected delay and the magnitudes of
effect tend to be larger.
Currently, many borrowers have negative equity in their properties and foreclo-
sure delays are lengthy. Our study indicates that under such circumstances, bor-
rower’s default decisions are more likely to be sensitive to the expected foreclosure
duration. From a policy perspective, while helping borrowers who have problems
paying their debt by allowing them a “breathing period” seems attractive5 (Stew-
art, 2010), this study suggests that it is also important not to make default optimal
for more borrowers because of the increased benefit from defaulting.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2.1 introduces the data and
variables. Section 3.3.1 describes the estimation model. Section 3.3 presents the
4Default happens either when borrower has no ability to pay or when he/she chooses not to pay. If default
is due to borrower’s lack of ability to pay, then foreclosure delays are not supposed to have any impact. On the
other hand, our finding that foreclosure delay has an impact on default behavior implies that there might be a
significant portion of strategic default.
5States that recently enacted foreclosure mitigation laws by giving homeowners “breathing period” include
California (90 days), New Jersey (180 days), and Nevada (indefinite time as long as homeowners are requesting
loan mediation).
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empirical results. Section 3.4 discusses the policy implications of this work and
concludes.
2.2 Data, Variables, and Summary Statistics
This section first describes data sources and sample selection, then introduces
specifications of other variables, followed by the measurement of foreclosure delay,
and discussion of the empirically measured delay.
2.2.1 Data Source and Sample Selection
We use several datasets for our study. The loan-level data comes from Blackbox
Logic’s BBx.6 BBx covers over 90 percent of US non-agency residential securitized
deals including prime, Alt-A and subprime loans. BBx has detailed mortgage con-
tract information at loan origination and monthly updates of mortgage payment
information. The S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices (HPI) are from Bloomberg
at the metropolitan (MSA) level. Unemployment data is from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics at the MSA level. National average 30 year fixed rate mortgage (FRM)
interest rates are from Freddie Mac’s national mortgage survey. The zip code level
household median income and other demographic variables come from the 2000
Census. Since our data are from privately securitized deals, the results may apply
only to this set of mortgages.
We limit the sample to single family, first lien loans with a 30 year contract term
in the ten major metropolitan areas that are included in the Case-Shiller 10-city
index. We use single family loans since S&P/Case-Shiller HPI is based on single
family transactions. The 30 year loan term is the most common loan term and
matches the Freddie Mac’s national mortgage survey on 30 year loans. We include
mortgages originated between January 2005 to December 2007 and track the loan
6BBx data is similar to Loan Performance data from CoreLogic. BBx data information is available at
www.bbxlogic.com.
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performances till December 2009.7 Since we use strict prior foreclosure delays in
the analysis, year 2001 to 2004 data are also used for estimating foreclosure delays.
So the time period used in the analysis is from 2001 to 2009. Loans may enter into
the dataset as seasoned loans. However seasoned loans may enter into the deals
only if they have at most one missing payment in the previous year. This may raise
the issue of survival bias. To control for survival bias problem, or the time a loan
enters into the database, we require loans to have the first observation of payment
information within three months of origination.
2.2.2 Variables
Table 2.1 provides the definitions of variables used in this study. The event of inter-
est is default. According to industry practice, default is defined as the first 90 days
delinquency. The status of the loan could be in default, prepaid in full, or censored8
in any given time period. If the loan is either in default or prepaid, all subsequent
observations are dropped out of the sample. One advantage of focusing on 90 days
delinquency rather than foreclosure is that default is mainly a borrower’s decision
while both borrower and servicer play a role in the foreclosure process, which may
complicate the analysis. Since our analysis focuses on the influence of foreclosure
delay on a borrower’s default propensity, defining 90 days delinquency as default is
a cleaner setting. Explanatory variables include foreclosure delay, loan characteris-
tics, borrower and neighborhood characteristics, past housing appreciation, lagged
unemployment rates, and controls for prepayment risk.
Loan characteristics include: HPI updated LTV ratio, piggyback dummy9 if the
property has junior liens at origination, initial contract rate, documentation status
7After 2007, because of the mortgage crisis, very few newly originated loans are added into the dataset.
8Loan status other than default or prepaid is considered censored which includes uninformative censoring and
current status.
9We use piggyback dummy and HPI updated LTV ratio rather than updated combined LTV ratio since after
loan origination, we do not have information about the status of the second lien loan.
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dummy, investor dummy, purchase dummy,10 loan amount and loan age. Borrower
characteristics include the Fico score. Also included are different loan types as
defined in Table 2.1. The performances of non-traditional loans are compared with
the fully amortized fixed rate mortgage (FRM) products.
Aspects of the community may affect the borrower’s utility of owning the prop-
erty and change the default threshold (LeSage and Pace, 2009). We include zip code
level median household income as a factor to capture the income effect. Other de-
mographic variables included are: population, white population, education, rent,
school age children, age over 65, average commute time to work, and percentage
of people living in the same house in 1995.
The expected future value of the house affects default decisions (Kau et al.,
1993; Foote et al., 2008). We thus include the previous year housing appreciation
as the proxy for housing expectation. Past appreciation also reflects the prior year
housing market condition. Since the prepayment option must be considered along
with the exercise of default option, we include the prepayment penalty dummy
and national interest rate difference from loan origination date to the loan activity
date to account for the competing risk of prepayment. Lagged unemployment rate
is included to help capture local macroeconomic information.
2.2.3 Foreclosure Delay
This section first describes the measurement of foreclosure delay, then discusses
the empirically measured delay.
Foreclosure delays are first measured at the individual loan level by the duration
from the 30 day delinquency to real estate owned (REO) or property sold at the
foreclosure auction. If a borrower makes m payments after being in delinquency
10Although it is important to separate cash out refinance and rate refinance, our data does not allow us to
reliably do so.
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TABLE 2.1. Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
Default First 90 days delinquency.
ForeclosureDelay Lagged state-level foreclosure delays, see discussion in
Section 3.2.1.
ExoticARM Dummy variable, =1 if adjustable rate mortgage with
deferred amortization provisions including interest only,
negative amortization and/or balloon payment, =0 oth-
erwise.
HybridARM Dummy variable, =1 if adjustable rate mortgage with
fixed initial interest rate, no deferred amortization pro-
visions, =0 otherwise.
RegARM Dummy variable, =1 if adjustable rate mortgage with
no fixed initial interest rate, no deferred amortization
provisions, =0 otherwise.
ExoticFRM Dummy variable, =1 if fixed rate mortgage with deferred
amortization provisions including interest only and/or
balloon payment, =0 otherwise.
FRM Dummy variable, =1 if fully amortized fixed rate mort-
gage, =0 otherwise.
Piggyback Dummy variable, =1 if the property has junior liens at
origination, =0 otherwise.
LTV1 HPI updated loan-to-value ratio.
CLTV Combined loan-to-value ratio at origination.
FICO Fair, Isaac and Company credit score of the borrower at
origination, scaled by 100.
Interest Initial contract rate of the mortgage.
FullDoc Dummy variable, =1 if borrower offers full documenta-
tion for loan application, =0 otherwise.
Purchase Dummy variable, =1 if the loan is for new purchase, =0
otherwise.
Investor Dummy variable, =1 if the purpose of the use of the
house as an investment, =0 otherwise.
LoanAmount The original loan amount, scaled by 10000.
LoanAge Loan age in year.
PrepayPenalty Dummy variable, =1 if the loan has prepayment penalty,
=0 otherwise.
RateDiff Difference of 30 year national average FRM rate between
current period and at loan origination.
PastAppr Past year housing appreciation at MSA level.
Lag Unemployment Lagged unemployment rate at MSA level.
Income Log median household income at zip code level.
Rent Log median rent at zip code level.
Population Log total population at zip code level.
White Log white population at zip code level.
Age65 Log population 65+ at zip code level.
Education % with high school or higher degree at zip code level.
SchoolAgeChildren % between age 5 and 18 at zip code level.
CommuteTime Log average commute time to work at zip code level.
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status, then m is subtracted from the duration to get the individual loan level
foreclosure delays. Effectively, our measure of foreclosure delay represents the pe-
riod of maximum “free rent” that borrower could obtain from default. Then the
individual delays are aggregated at state-year level according to the date of fore-
closure termination.11 We use the lagged state-level foreclosure delays to proxy for
the borrower’s expected “free rent” from default.12 Since the foreclosure delays are
measured by the duration of delays of the foreclosure cases concluded preceding the
year of loan activity date, this strict prior measurement ensures that past delays
may affect future default, while future default can not affect past delays. Thus,
this proxy avoids the simultaneity issues.
Table 2.2 reports the state-level mean foreclosure delays according to the year
of foreclosure concluded. Foreclosure delay shows variations across states as well
as over time. For example, for foreclosure cases concluded in year 2008, Virginia
had a less than a eight month foreclosure time, while New York required almost 16
months to finish the foreclosure process. The foreclosure periods materially increase
over time in most states.13 For example, New York more than doubled the actual
foreclosure period from 2003 to 2008.
Compared to the delay used in the existing literature such as the optimum
foreclosure timeline from the National Mortgage Servicer’s Reference Directory
(USFN, 2004), whose measures assume no extra delay and are based on non-
11Another possible way is by aggregating according to the start of the foreclosure. However, this measure might
either raise the simultaneity issue or create a selection bias concern. We also tried to estimate the predicted
duration through survival models according to the year of foreclosure start while taking care of the censoring
issue. However it seems that the predicted value are not very accurate. Although these two measures also have
expected sign for delay variable, we decided to stay with our measure.
12From transaction cost and benefit perspective, even though we controlled for detailed loan characteristics,
borrower characteristics and neighborhood characteristics, which are supposed to absorb large extent of equity
consideration, reputation cost, and social capital cost, there is still possibility of omitted cost or benefit. However,
only if the omitted cost/benefit are significantly large and highly correlated with foreclosure delay variable, we
would not expect the effect of foreclosure delay to change materially.
13Foreclosure law itself changed little in our sample period. The reason why the foreclosure times increased
significantly over this time period needs future research. Since year 2009 many states changed the foreclosure
laws, as a robustness check, we took year 2009 observations out of the sample and the results are similar.
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TABLE 2.2. State Mean Foreclosure Delay by Year of Foreclosure Termination
ST 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
CA 5.02 5.38 7.20 8.68 8.42 9.44
CO 5.94 7.41 7.70 8.20 8.57 9.69
DC 8.06 6.59 7.07 7.12 7.63 8.99
FL 7.37 7.68 8.66 8.49 9.43 12.11
IL 9.23 10.39 10.81 11.96 12.12 13.28
IN 10.10 10.03 11.01 12.43 14.01 14.53
MA 4.95 5.12 7.11 8.71 9.05 11.22
MD 7.16 7.57 8.11 7.32 7.53 9.46
NH 5.09 6.27 5.75 7.13 8.31 9.53
NJ 6.52 5.43 7.20 10.25 12.16 15.11
NV 6.21 5.80 6.20 8.03 8.49 9.33
NY 6.63 7.52 8.82 11.29 12.79 15.97
PA 11.20 10.00 12.67 10.83 12.46 14.37
VA 5.50 5.06 5.12 5.96 6.25 7.52
WI 7.33 11.93 11.88 11.55 12.79 13.88
WV 4.00 10.25 7.67 10.33 7.43 8.27
contested foreclosure actions, ours are the actual durations which include extra
delays. More important, our measure captures the time variation of foreclosure
delays. State foreclosure laws affect foreclosure delays and help explain the vari-
ations across states.14 However, the dynamic nature of delay over time indicates
that there are other factors affecting the foreclosure duration as well. Given that,
the actual foreclosure duration, instead of the state minimum foreclosure duration,
might better represent the borrower’s expected “free rent” from default.
2.3 Cox Proportional Hazard Model
We use the Cox competing-risk proportional hazard model (Cox, 1972) to inves-
tigate the factors that may affect the probability of default. The Cox model can
14Judicial procedures require the foreclosure action to go through the court and the complex procedures required
by court can lead to longer foreclosure times. Nonjudicial procedures are conducted by private parties and typically
are shorter. States may adopt judicial or nonjudicial procedures or both. However, for states that allow both
procedures, typically one procedure will dominate the other. State laws also specify various regulated time lines
such as when the notice of default should be mailed, the length of time before the arrangement of foreclosure sale,
when the notice of sale should be sent, and how long the sale advertisement should be posted. The time frames
set by the state law are the minimum foreclosure duration.
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take care of right censoring and take time from origination to default into con-
sideration. The basic model specification is as in (2.1), where h(t) is the hazard
function of default and λ0(t) is called the baseline hazard function. The explana-
tory variables in X include both static variables and time-varying variables. Static
variables are obtained at or prior to loan origination, while dynamic variables are
updated quarterly.
h(t,X) = λ0(t) exp(Xβ) (2.1)
The Cox model is a semi-parametric technique that does not require choosing
a specific probability distribution of the survival time (baseline hazard function),
and is considered a more robust approach. At each time period, the status of a loan
could be default, prepaid, or censored which includes uninformative censoring such
as leaving the dataset for reasons other than default or prepayment. Prepayment
is taken as a competing risk.
State economic, culture and law issues may affect mortgage market behavior
(Ghent and Kudlyak, 2010; Pence, 2006; Lin and White, 2001; Berkowitz and
Hynes, 1999). These omitted variables may be correlated with included explanatory
variables and lead to biased estimation. In order to account for the differences
among states, we include the state fixed effect in the hazard model by allowing
the baseline hazard to be estimated separately for each state. Since the state fixed
effect captures the cross sectional variation between states, our results are driven
by the change of foreclosure delays over time. This is a similar approach as Lin
and White (2001) and Berkowitz and Hynes (1999) using fixed effects to control




This section sets forth the Cox hazard model to study the effects of various fac-
tors on borrower’s default decision. Section 2.4.1 presents the overall results. Sec-
tion 2.4.2 focuses on the various robustness check of the impacts of foreclosure
delays on default behavior. Section 2.4.3 investigates the sensitivity of default to
expected foreclosure duration for different initial combined LTV ratio loans. The
event of interest is the first 90 days delinquency, with prepayment as the compet-
ing risk. We estimate the reduced form equation. The reported standard errors are
clustered by state.
2.4.1 Foreclosure Delays and Future Default
Table 2.3 reports the results of various specifications of the Cox proportional haz-
ard model. Regression one is the result without a delay variable. Regression two to
four use the lagged mean state-level delay. Regression three includes the temporal
fixed effects. State specific factors regarding deficiency judgments, statutory right
of redemption and homestead exemption may also have an effect on the mortgage
market. To control for such difference, we include the state fixed effects in regres-
sions four and five. As a robustness check of the proxies for delay expectations,
regression five uses smoothed delays by taking the average of the past two years
delays since information transfer might take time and also may accumulate over
time.
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TABLE 2.3. Hazard Model of Default with Different Model Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
State FE
No Delay With Delay Year FE Mean Smooth
ForeclosureDelay 0.0749∗∗ 0.0618∗∗ 0.0940∗∗ 0.1013∗∗
(0.0146) (0.0180) (0.0218) (0.0239)
ExoticARM 0.6443∗∗ 0.6613∗∗ 0.6581∗∗ 0.6346∗∗ 0.6340∗∗
(0.0282) (0.0256) (0.0248) (0.0242) (0.0248)
HybridARM 0.6554∗∗ 0.6449∗∗ 0.6525∗∗ 0.6216∗∗ 0.6209∗∗
(0.0187) (0.0165) (0.0150) (0.0202) (0.0204)
ExoticFRM 0.2747∗∗ 0.2821∗∗ 0.2740∗∗ 0.2787∗∗ 0.2781∗∗
(0.0431) (0.0462) (0.0458) (0.0460) (0.0465)
RegARM 0.4526∗∗ 0.4302∗∗ 0.4140∗∗ 0.4044∗∗ 0.4062∗∗
(0.0653) (0.0634) (0.0625) (0.0631) (0.0634)
LTV1 0.0231∗∗ 0.0240∗∗ 0.0239∗∗ 0.0255∗∗ 0.0256∗∗
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0015) (0.0014)
PiggyBack 0.5375∗∗ 0.5424∗∗ 0.5469∗∗ 0.5389∗∗ 0.5379∗∗
(0.0376) (0.0333) (0.0312) (0.0317) (0.0313)
Interest 0.0724∗∗ 0.0682∗∗ 0.0659∗∗ 0.0704∗∗ 0.0701∗∗
(0.0084) (0.0070) (0.0076) (0.0070) (0.0070)
FICO −0.8210∗∗ −0.8078∗∗ −0.8101∗∗ −0.8059∗∗ −0.8066∗∗
(0.0426) (0.0426) (0.0424) (0.0380) (0.0377)
FullDoc −0.3477∗∗ −0.3516∗∗ −0.3474∗∗ −0.3518∗∗ −0.3522∗∗
(0.0346) (0.0364) (0.0365) (0.0345) (0.0345)
Investor 0.0777 0.0714 0.0716 0.0823 0.0828
(0.0445) (0.0452) (0.0463) (0.0440) (0.0440)
Purchase −0.0125 −0.0198 −0.0092 −0.0179 −0.0184
(0.0150) (0.0159) (0.0144) (0.0162) (0.0161)
LoanAmount 0.0030 0.0045∗∗ 0.0046∗∗ 0.0030 0.0029
(0.0026) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0019)
LoanAge −0.5046∗∗ −0.5411∗∗ −0.5917∗∗ −0.5659∗∗ −0.5620∗∗
(0.0144) (0.0203) (0.0319) (0.0276) (0.0295)
PrepayPenalty 0.1124 0.1442 0.1466∗∗ 0.1852∗∗ 0.1843∗∗
(0.0620) (0.0564) (0.0569) (0.0579) (0.0579)
RateDiff −0.3650∗∗ −0.3120∗∗ −0.2533∗∗ −0.3502∗∗ −0.3620∗∗
(0.0425) (0.0392) (0.0239) (0.0376) (0.0314)
PastAppr −1.0549∗∗ −1.3477∗∗ −0.9493∗∗ −1.5329∗∗ −1.2967∗∗
(0.1647) (0.1262) (0.1475) (0.1470) (0.1414)
Lag Unemployment −0.2018∗∗ −0.2272∗∗ −0.2463∗∗ −0.2736∗∗ −0.2702∗∗
Continued on next page
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No Delay With Delay Year Mean Smooth
(0.0274) (0.0300) (0.0315) (0.0483) (0.0477)
Income −0.0300 0.0396 0.0186 0.0408 0.0424
(0.1725) (0.1563) (0.1494) (0.1290) (0.1301)
Rent 0.1055 0.0852 0.1026 −0.0481 −0.0456
(0.2155) (0.1511) (0.1510) (0.1409) (0.1397)
Population −0.0061 0.0401 0.0311 0.0368 0.0364
(0.0461) (0.0455) (0.0454) (0.0375) (0.0373)
White 0.0288 0.0048 0.0094 −0.0469∗∗ −0.0473∗∗
(0.0405) (0.0350) (0.0377) (0.0175) (0.0175)
Age65 0.0067 −0.0172 −0.0052 0.0264 0.0272
(0.0267) (0.0332) (0.0313) (0.0300) (0.0298)
Education −1.2855∗∗ −1.2222∗∗ −1.2992∗∗ −1.2034∗∗ −1.2043∗∗
(0.2802) (0.3048) (0.3091) (0.2983) (0.2991)
SchoolageChildren 0.4840 0.8627 0.8846 0.5197 0.5157
(0.4255) (0.5915) (0.5479) (0.4202) (0.4175)
CommuteTime 0.3779 0.2437 0.2113 0.1260 0.1305
(0.1672) (0.1798) (0.1762) (0.0688) (0.0709)
SameHouse 0.1434 −0.3609 −0.3252 −0.5641∗∗ −0.5690∗∗
(0.3265) (0.2235) (0.2055) (0.1715) (0.1741)
Default(in%) 3.13
Number of Obs 4118336
LikelihoodRatio 127756 129484 116217 125904 125834
-2 lnL 2991728 2989999 2753202 2487099 2487170
∗∗ p < 0.01
33
Across various specifications, foreclosure delay consistently shows a statistically
significant effect in increasing the borrower’s propensity to default.15 The results
are consistent with the prediction of Ambrose et al. (1997) theoretical paper. The
next important question is, whether the expected benefit from default has a ma-
terial economic effect on default propensity? To make the economic significance
of foreclosure delays clearer, Table 2.4 reports the marginal effects and equiva-
lent changes associated with a given month increase in foreclosure delay corre-
sponding to the two different measures of delay as in regression four and five.
The marginal effects represent the percentage change in the hazard ratio associ-
ated with an increase of the delay. Since hazard ratio is not very intuitive,16 a
more intuitive way to gauge the economic importance of a variable is by com-
paring the marginal effects between variables in the same regression. That is by
calculating the equivalent changes in other variables corresponding to the same
marginal effects of the variable of interest. We pick updated LTV ratio and Fico
score as the benchmark variables since those are important risk factors and are
also continuous variables. Based on state mean foreclosure measures as in regres-
sion four, a three-month increase in foreclosure time increases the hazard of default
by 32.58 percent (exp (0.094 · 3) − 1 = 32.58%). In terms of equivalent changes,
that matches the same marginal effect of increasing the LTV ratio by 11.06 percent
(exp (0.0255 · 11.06)− 1 = 32.58%), or a decrease in the Fico score by 34.99 points
(exp (−0.8059 · −34.99/100)−1 = 32.58%). Note that these estimates are based on
the overall sample including those borrowers with positive equity on their house.
15As a robustness check, the results are similar when using lagged state median foreclosure delays as the proxy
for borrower expected delays.
16For example, for the Cox hazard model, the marginal effect tends to be larger for all variables for samples
with lower default rates and be lower for samples with higher default rates.
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For borrowers with negative equity, we expect that the economic impact would be
even stronger.
TABLE 2.4. Marginal Effects of Foreclosure Delays and Equivalent Changes in Other
Variables
Increase in Foreclosure Delay (in month)
Variable 1 2 3 6
Panel A State Mean
Marginal Effect (%) 9.86 20.68 32.58 75.77
LTV1 (%) 3.69 7.37 11.06 22.12
FICO −10.94 −21.89 −32.83 −65.66
Panel B Smooth
Marginal Effect (%) 10.66 22.46 35.51 83.64
LTV1 (%) 3.96 7.91 11.87 23.74
FICO −12.56 −25.12 −37.68 −75.35
Other explanatory variables have the expected signs. The results show that de-
fault reflects borrower expectations, incentives, and preferences. Specifically, bor-
rowers with less equity as measured by a higher updated LTV ratio, second lien
status, and thus with less equity, have a higher propensity to default. Borrowers
that have selected more exotic and complicated loans have a higher propensity
to default. Borrowers with a lower credit score and less documentation are more
likely to default. Borrowers with a greater payment burden such as those with
higher contract rates or higher borrowed amounts tend to have a higher chance of
default. Borrower with a longer payment history are less likely to default. Areas
with better educated population reduce the probability of default. Macroeconomic
conditions also affect the performance of loans.
2.4.2 Robustness Checks
This section conducts robustness checks of the impact of foreclosure time on bor-
rower’s default behavior. Because regression four has the highest model fit as shown
in Table 2.3, we pick regression four as our baseline regression. All following re-
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gressions in this section and next section include the same explanatory variables
as the baseline regression, including the state fixed effect and using the lag year
state mean foreclosure delay.
Our first concern is whether the effect is driven by a specific state. For example,
California constitutes a substantial proportion of our sample. In order to check
this, we take one state out of the sample at a time and run the regression using
the mortgages from the rest of the states, Table 2.5 reports the results for the five
largest states in our sample.17 Panel A reports the estimate and model fit statistics
and panel B reports the marginal effect and the equivalent changes corresponding
to a three-month increase in delay. The results show that the impact of delay is
not driven by a specific state. The marginal effect of a three-month increase in
delay, is equivalent to an increase of LTV ratio by 10.14 percent to 18.20 percent
or a 31.81 to 58.43 points decrease in Fico score. Interestingly, when California or
Florida is taken out of the sample, the impact of delay is increased, although the
increase might not necessarily be significant.
Our second concern is the accuracy of the data since mortgage data has many
limitations. Typically, borrower characteristics are measured carefully only at orig-
ination. After origination, most servicers do not rescore the borrower’s credit or
reappraise the property value using either traditional appraisals or automated val-
uation models. In addition, most data files do not contain accurate amounts for
junior liens after origination. Consequently, the most accurate data exists at orig-
ination. In order to control for the accuracy of data, we report the results by
tracking the first one, two, three or four years of loan performances after loan orig-
ination. Table 2.6 reports the estimate and the comparative statics. The magnitude
17Other states have similar results. For simplicity, we included only the largest states results.
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TABLE 2.5. Robustness Checks by Taking One State Out Each Time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A CA NY IL FL NJ
ForeclosureDelay 0.1486∗∗ 0.1123∗∗ 0.0871∗∗ 0.1147∗∗ 0.0852∗∗
(0.0188) (0.0284) (0.0203) (0.0266) (0.0253)
Default(in%) 3.31 3.12 3.06 2.93 3.13
Number of Obs 2307318 3648457 3664935 3739133 3756776
LikelihoodRatio 68239 113873 115853 114492 116768
-2 lnL 1403227 2252045 2216541 2193598 2330156
Panel B Marginal Effects (3M) and Equivalent Changes
Marginal Effect (%) 56.17 40.06 29.86 41.07 29.12
LTV1 (%) 18.20 13.42 10.33 12.65 10.14
FICO −58.43 −41.99 −32.08 −41.23 −31.81
∗∗ p < 0.01∗ p < 0.05
of statistical and economical significance is relatively stable across the different
specifications.
Overall, after considering state specific effects, geography, different measure-
ments of delay, and number of years that loan performances are tracked, the results
show that the expected delays have a significant impact on the default behavior of
borrowers.
2.4.3 LTV Ratio and Expected Delay
Ambrose et al. (1997) used numerical simulation to show that loans with higher
initial LTV ratio are more sensitive to expected delay change. The magnitude of
effect are larger for high LTV ratio loans. This section empirically investigates the
sensitivity to the change in expected delay for different initial LTV ratio loans.
Rational borrowers will not choose to default whenever they have positive equity
in the house since they could sell the house in the market and make a higher profit
relative to defaulting and giving the house back to the lender. Negative equity is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for default because of the value of waiting to
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TABLE 2.6. Robustness Checks by Number of Years of Loan Performance Tracked
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A One Year Two Years Three Years Four Years
ForeclosureDelay 0.1094∗ 0.1354∗∗ 0.1011∗∗ 0.0949∗∗
(0.0542) (0.0469) (0.0195) (0.0218)
Default(in%) 0.94 1.92 2.72 3.09
Number of Obs 666546 2197112 3279224 3865093
LikelihoodRatio 7394 47284 93570 118313
-2 lnL 108637 820970 1745491 2343463
Panel B Marginal Effects (3M) and Equivalent Changes
Marginal Effect (%) 38.85 50.11 35.43 32.94
LTV1 (%) 10.55 13.91 11.11 10.99
FICO −55.21 −51.37 −37.30 −35.27
∗∗ p < 0.01∗ p < 0.05
default, transaction costs, and reputation costs (Kau and Kim, 1994; Kau et al.,
1994; Foote et al., 2008). Higher initial combined LTV ratio loans are less resistant
to house price depreciation and more likely to have an “in the money” default
option. When the default option is “in the money,” foreclosure delay tends to have
a material effect on changing the borrower’s propensity to default.
Table 2.7 reports the results by different initial combined LTV ratio subsamples.
For loans with combined LTV ratio greater than 80 percent, the borrower’s default
decision is statistically very sensitive to expected delay. As the combined LTV ratio
decreases, to below 80 percent, the statistical significance declines, and the effect
disappears when combined LTV ratio is less than 70 percent. As for economic
significance, the magnitudes of effect are much higher for loans with combined
LTV ratio greater than 95 percent than loans with combined LTV less than 80
percent. Our empirical findings are very consistent with the theoretical prediction.
The results indicate that in a deteriorated housing market, when borrowers are
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likely to have negative equity, the increase in expected delay tends to have a larger
and more significant impact in increasing default.
TABLE 2.7. Subsamples by Initial CLTV Ratios
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A CLTV<70 70-80 80-90 90-95 95-100 100<CLTV
ForeclosureDelay 0.0360 0.0649∗ 0.0627∗∗ 0.0483∗∗ 0.1235∗∗ 0.1491∗∗
(0.0327) (0.0305) (0.0235) (0.0180) (0.0271) (0.0268)
Default(in%) 1.18 2.34 3.51 4.48 4.65 6.16
Number of Obs 1136076 798112 626715 441045 192625 514574
LikelihoodRatio 18216 16958 28347 12579 5391 12936
-2 lnL 218957 302258 610022 304996 120200 501589
Panel B Marginal Effects (3M) and Equivalent Changes
Marginal Effect (%) 21.49 20.70 15.59 44.85 56.41
FICO −19.42 −23.16 −19.50 −51.32 −73.39
∗∗ p < 0.01∗ p < 0.05
Next we investigate if the effect of expected delay is sensitive to different loan
types or borrower’s credit score. We focus on loans with initial combined LTV
greater than 95 percent. Table 2.8 report the results of subsamples of different
loan types. Table 2.9 reports the results of the subsamples according to different
borrower’s credit score. Across different types of loans and different borrower’s
credit scores, expected delays consistently increase the default propensity. For very
high credit score borrowers, the effect is only significant at the 5 percent level. This
may due to the cost of damaging credit score and reputation cost, which may offset
the benefits from “free rent.”
In conclusion, the effect of foreclosure delay is stronger when borrowers are
likely to have negative equity such as in the current housing market. The increase
in foreclosure time might change borrower’s expected benefit from default, and
thus at the margin make default the optimal decision.
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TABLE 2.8. Subsamples by Loan Types for Initial CLTV>95% Loans
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A ExoticARM HybridARM ExoticFRM FRM
ForeclosureDelay 0.1598∗∗ 0.1311∗∗ 0.2023∗∗ 0.1469∗∗
(0.0271) (0.0503) (0.0222) (0.0534)
Default(in%) 6.70 7.05 4.68 2.79
Number of Obs 315420 84495 69179 66265
LikelihoodRatio 7257 2045 1549 1362
-2 lnL 329078 74655 39314 20763
∗∗ p < 0.01∗ p < 0.05
TABLE 2.9. Subsamples by Fico Scores For Initial CLTV>95% Loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A Fico≤620 620-660 660-700 700-740 740-780 780<Fico
ForeclosureDelay 0.1200∗∗ 0.1818∗∗ 0.2174∗∗ 0.2278∗∗ 0.1945∗∗ 0.1553∗
(0.0336) (0.0355) (0.0453) (0.0356) (0.0476) (0.0791)
Default(in%) 9.61 7.84 6.27 5.01 3.80 3.01
Number of Obs 54715 91792 143469 138947 82736 25646
LikelihoodRatio 61165 90914 124120 96862 40845 18327
-2lnL 966 1539 2361 2543 1517 343
∗∗ p < 0.01∗ p < 0.05
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2.5 Conclusion
The benefit of default rises with the length of the interval between the first miss-
ing payment and the date of foreclosure sale. Therefore, the higher option value
associated with the expected longer foreclosure periods increase the incentive to
default.
This paper empirically investigates the influence of expected foreclosure delays
on borrower’s default propensities. The paper uses the actual time-varying state-
level foreclosure times as proxies for the borrowers’ expected benefit from default in
the form of “free rent.” While existing literature includes a single-year state non-
contested foreclosure times as proxies for lengthiness of the foreclosure process,
our measure includes the actual delay and captures the variation in foreclosure
delays over time. We document the increase of delay in recent years and find a
statistically and economically significant impact of expected delay on borrower
default behavior. The results are robust to various specifications including state
fixed effects, different measures for delays, and temporal fixed effects. The results
are not driven by major states in the sample nor by the number of years of tracked
loan performances. For high initial combined LTV ratio mortgages, the delay has
stronger impact on default and the effect is consistent across various loan types
and borrowers with different credit scores. Our empirical findings are consistent
with the predictions of Ambrose et al. (1997) theoretical paper.
From the viewpoints of elected leaders in state and local government, not much
good comes from foreclosures. Mortgage borrowers are potential voters and survival
bias ensures that elected leaders pay attention to such groups. Therefore, it is
tempting for officials such as elected judges, sheriffs, and legislators to delay the
foreclosure process through slow performance or through more explicit tactics such
as a moratorium.
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However, this research offers evidence of the potential negative effects arising
from longer foreclosure periods. Longer periods of de facto or de jure forbearance
increase borrowers’ incentives to default which may result in more borrowers en-
tering into default. In the current market condition with many borrowers having
negative equity, the longer delay tends to have a larger magnitude of impact on
default, which may make default an optimal decision for more borrowers. The neg-
ative effects of longer foreclosure delay might need to be taken into consideration
whenever taking action trying to mitigate the foreclosure crisis.
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Chapter 3
Using Housing Futures in Mortgage
Research
3.1 Introduction
Economic decisions often rely on expectations of variables in the future. This
presents a difficulty when working with empirical data since most variables rep-
resent the outcomes of past decisions and therefore may imperfectly capture such
expectations.
For example, the expected house price plays a role in individual default deci-
sion since this affects both the benefit and the cost of making mortgage payments
through the perceived value of the property and the option to default in the fu-
ture (Kau and Kim, 1994; Ambrose et al., 1997; Foote et al., 2008). While many
researchers (e.g., Shiller, 2007) pay attention to the role of housing expectations in
the current mortgage crisis, obtaining a reasonable proxy for expected housing ap-
preciation is a challenge. The fundamental difficulty is that market expectations are
typically not directly observable. Because of this difficulty, current empirical mort-
gage research either (1) does not include housing expectation proxies in empirical
models (e.g., Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 2009), (2) uses past housing apprecia-
tion (e.g., Bajari et al., 2008), or (3) uses a time series forecast (e.g., Goetzmann
et al., 2009) as the proxy.
This paper proposes a new proxy of housing expectations in mortgage models
by using the information from the transaction prices of Case-Shiller housing fu-
tures. Since the contract prices of futures are based on market participants’ beliefs
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concerning future housing prices, the transaction prices incorporate the market
expectation of housing prices.1
This paper compares the performances of four different housing expectation
proxies in explaining default behavior. The four proxies are futures, past year
appreciation from the Case-Shiller house price index (CSI), past year appreciation
from the Federal Housing Finance Agency house price index (FHFA), and time
series forecasts. In addition, we investigate the additional information content of
futures that is not contained in the past price based measures.
The results show that futures are a promising proxy for housing expectations.
First, futures have the highest regression model fit among all four measures. This
indicates that futures might explain default behavior better than other measures.
Second, only futures consistently show that higher housing expectations lower the
default propensity, as theory suggests. Other measures either exhibit mixed signs
or are statistically insignificant. Third, even after combining other proxies in the
same regression, the coefficient estimates and standard errors of futures remain
about the same as with only futures in the regressions. This reveals that futures
contain information not captured by historical prices.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 introduces the data and
variables, Section 3.3 presents the empirical results, and Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Data, Variables and Summary Statistics
This section first describes data sources and sample selection in Section 3.2.1, then
introduces variables and specifications in Section 3.2.2, and the summary statistics
in Section 3.2.3.
1Financial futures are viewed as the market expectation of underlying product price movements in financial
derivative literature. For example, the Federal funds futures are widely used as the market expectations of future
monetary policies (e.g., Krueger and Kuttner, 1996; Grkaynak et al., 2007).
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3.2.1 Data
The S&P/Case-Shiller home price indices (CSI) and the contract prices of housing
futures with CSI as the underlying asset are from Bloomberg at the metropolitan
(MSA) level. Housing futures are traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
(CME). House price indices from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) are
downloaded from their website at the MSA level.2 The loan-level data comes from
Blackbox Logic’s BBx.3 BBx covers over 90 percent of US non-agency residential
securitized deals.4 BBx has detailed mortgage origination information and monthly
updates of mortgage payment information. Unemployment data is from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics at the MSAs level. National average 30 year fixed rate mortgage
(FRM) interest rates are from Freddie Mac’s national mortgage survey. The zip
code level household median incomes are from the 2000 Census.
Our sample includes single family, first lien loans with a 30 year contract term in
the ten MSAs with housing futures transactions. We include mortgages originated
between May 2006, when housing futures started trading on CME,5 to December
2007 and track the loan performances quarterly through December 2009.6 Mort-
gages are limited to those entering the dataset within three months of origination
to control for survival bias. The number of loan-quarter observations is 1.7M, with
default rate equal to 4.12%.
3.2.2 Variables
The event of interest is default, which is defined as the first 90 days delinquency.
At each time period, the status of the loan could be in default, prepaid in full, or
2FHFA website: www.fhfa.gov
3BBx data is similar to Loan Performance data. BBx data information is available at
www.bbxlogic.com/data.htm.
4Since our data is from privately securitized loans, the results may apply only to this set of mortgages.
5Although Case et al. (1993) have long been advocating a derivative market for housing in US, it was not until
May 2006 that such a market was established.
6After 2007, because of the mortgage crisis, very few newly originated loans were added into the dataset.
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censored.7 If the loan is either in default or prepaid, all subsequent observations
are dropped out of the sample. Explanatory variables include housing expectations,
loan/borrower characteristics, lagged unemployment rates, neighborhood median
income and controls for prepayment risk. The variable definitions appear in Ta-
ble 3.1.
This study examines four measures of housing expectations. The futures prox-
ies are inferred from the transaction prices of housing futures. The CME issues
futures contracts each quarter in February, May, August, and November. Market
participants include builders and developers, lenders, mortgage portfolio managers,
mutual funds, other financial institutions, and individual investors. We first calcu-
late the average transaction prices of futures in the trading month one year before
the maturity date, then divide the number by lagged two months CSI, and minus
one to get the quarterly expectations.8 Next we linearly interpolate the quarterly
data to get the monthly expectations. The second measure is the previous one year
appreciation from CSI. The third measure is the previous one year appreciation
from the FHFA index.
The fourth measure is the one year forecasts from time series model based on
CSI. We decide to use the autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA)
model since this is the most commonly used time series model. Seasonal factors
are included in the model to account for the seasonal pattern of housing prices. We
first select the lags of the model, then use a 20 year rolling time window to fit the
data each month for each MSA area, then forecast. This approach is more dynamic
and allows the model to incorporate the new information for each time period. The
7Loan status other than default or prepaid is considered censored which includes uninformative censoring and
current status.
8Lagged two months HPI is used since the release of CSI is lagged by two months and that represents the
information available at the transaction time.
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TABLE 3.1. Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
Default First 90 days delinquency.
Expectation Proxies for housing appreciation expectation.
Futures Housing expectation derived from housing futures.
Past CSI Past year appreciation from CSI.
Past FHHA Past year appreciation from FHFA housing index.
Time Series Time series forecast of next year housing appreciation.
CLTV HPI updated current loan-to-value ratio.
Piggyback Dummy variable, =1 if the property has junior liens at
origination, =0 otherwise.
Interest Initial contract rate of the mortgage.
FICO Fair, Isaac and Company credit score of the borrower at
origination, scaled by 100.
FullDoc Dummy variable, =1 if borrower offers full documenta-
tion for loan application, =0 otherwise.
ExoticARM Dummy variable, =1 if adjustable rate mortgage with
deferred amortization provisions including interest only,
negative amortization and/or balloon payment, =0 oth-
erwise.
HybridARM Dummy variable, =1 if adjustable rate mortgage with
fixed initial interest rate, no deferred amortization pro-
visions, =0 otherwise.
RegARM Dummy variable, =1 if adjustable rate mortgage with
no fixed initial interest rate, no deferred amortization
provisions, =0 otherwise.
ExoticFRM Dummy variable, =1 if fixed rate mortgage with deferred
amortization provisions including interest only and/or
balloon payment, =0 otherwise.
FRM Dummy variable, =1 if fully amortized fixed rate mort-
gage, =0 otherwise.
Investor Dummy variable, =1 if the purpose of the use of the
house as an investment, =0 otherwise.
Purchase Dummy variable, =1 if new purchase, =0 otherwise.
LoanAmount The original loan amount, scaled by 10000.
LoanAge Loan age in year.
PrepayPenalty Dummy variable, =1 if the loan has prepayment penalty,
=0 otherwise.
RateDiff Difference of 30 year national average FRM rate between
current period and at loan origination.
Lag UnemploymentLagged unemployment rate at MSA level.
Income Log median household income at zip code level.
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selection criteria for the lags is to make all 44 (from May 2006 to December 2009)
rolling window regressions converge for each MSA. Due to the unusual housing
price movements in our sample time period, the time series regressions do not
converge in many cases when using longer lags. Therefore, we use relatively short
time period lags in our model. Eight MSAs use ARIMA(12, 1, 0) and two MSAs
use ARIMA(6, 1, 0). We use a simple time series model since simple models often
perform better in forecasting competitions (Makridakis et al., 1983).
3.2.3 Summary Statistics
Table 3.2 reports the summary statistics of the different proxies for housing expec-
tations for the ten MSA areas. Several patterns appear. First, at the average level,
different proxies yield quite different means and distributions. For example, in Las
Vegas, futures point to a less than four percent depreciation and other measures
forecast more than ten percent depreciation. However in Denver, expectations from
housing futures have the largest predicted depreciation. In general, housing futures
have smaller dispersion than other measures. Second, previous year appreciations
from CSI and FHFA also show differences. In nine out of ten MSAs, the past CSI
displays greater volatility of housing appreciation over time. Past CSI also points
to more pessimistic expectations than the past FHFA indices in all ten MSA areas.
The main reason for the difference of the two indices lies in the different composi-
tion of the underlying assets. FHFA includes only mortgages purchased by Fannie
Mae or Freddie Mac, while CSI has a broader coverage of underlying properties.
Other reasons are that FHFA uses both transaction and appraisal values while
CSI uses only transaction prices, and the weight given to properties with longer
intervals between transactions are also different (Leventis, 2008). Third, time series
forecasts show the largest dispersion in both the standard deviation and the range
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of estimates in all MSAs. Time series forecasts sometimes vary greatly. For exam-
ple, in San Francisco area, the most optimistic housing expectation is a 30 percent
appreciation while the most pessimistic estimate is a 66 percent depreciation.
Table 3.3 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between futures and other
housing expectation proxies. The number in the parenthesis under the correlation
coefficients is the p-value for the null hypothesis that the correlation coefficient is
not different from zero. First, note that the correlation coefficients are relatively
low with the highest number being slightly higher than 0.7. Using a one percent
significance level, past year appreciations from CSI and FHFA each have three
areas that are significantly positively correlated with housing futures expectations.
Time series forecasts have five MSAs that show significant correlations (although in
the Boston area, the correlation is negative). The results show that futures are not
highly correlated with other proxies. Both Table 3.2 and 3.3 indicate that futures
seem to be a quite different proxy from those measures that are extrapolated from
past housing prices.
3.3 Empirical Results
This section first introduces the estimation model in Section 3.3.1, then investigates
the performances of various proxies for housing expectations in explaining default
in Section 3.3.2, checks for robustness in Section 3.3.3, and studies the additional
information content of futures in Section 3.3.4.
3.3.1 Cox Proportional Hazard Model
The empirical analysis is conducted in the Cox proportional hazard model setting
(Cox, 1972) to investigate the factors that may affect the probability of default.
The advantages of the Cox model include that it can handle right censoring and
take time from origination to default into consideration. Also the Cox model is
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TABLE 3.2. Summary Statistics for Housing Expectation Proxies (in %)
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max
CBSA=14460 Boston
Futures −4.6808 2.4590 −8.2995 0.8356
Past CSI −4.5346 1.9237 −8.0053 0.4770
Past FHFA −3.3554 1.2550 −4.6500 0.4500
Time Series −4.7547 3.5673−13.5731 0.3566
CBSA=16980 Chicago
Futures −3.8792 3.2886−11.7906 5.0852
Past CSI −5.8422 7.8466−18.6532 7.6849
Past FHFA −1.7398 5.3723 −8.9900 7.8100
Time Series −6.4855 12.4193−43.6911 7.2820
CBSA=19740 Denver
Futures −4.5125 2.6685 −9.3917 2.3516
Past CSI −2.2830 2.6382 −5.6881 2.7772
Past FHFA −0.3121 0.7899 −1.8033 1.7400
Time Series −1.5451 3.6862 −9.6517 4.6329
CBSA=29820 Las Vegas
Futures −3.2647 9.3398−15.7927 20.2125
Past CSI−16.7394 14.4210−32.9763 7.8746
Past FHFA−12.7186 14.2806−33.7300 11.1800
Time Series−17.9104 19.2441−57.2766 8.0753
CBSA=31100 Los Angeles
Futures −6.7893 4.9870−22.0934 6.4944
Past CSI−10.5712 12.7485−27.9279 14.9738
Past FHFA −5.6660 11.4961−20.7400 18.9000
Time Series−12.1778 19.2989−52.6732 21.3298
CBSA=33100 Miami
Futures −4.8379 6.3580−17.6105 7.7476
Past CSI−12.3374 15.6310−29.4916 22.7125
Past FHFA −5.6470 16.5448−26.8300 24.4500
Time Series−13.8387 20.4941−64.5320 26.1679
CBSA=35620 New York
Futures −6.7376 3.6110−13.5945 5.8181
Past CSI −4.4843 5.7370−12.3408 10.0071
Past FHFA −1.0267 4.9428 −6.1100 10.4800
Time Series −5.3705 6.5273−22.1037 7.2710
CBSA=41740 San Diego
Futures −6.1728 3.5785−16.6525 −0.2580
Past CSI−12.2356 9.6607−26.6796 2.9504
Past FHFA −8.3371 6.4701−18.3300 4.5400
Time Series−13.0589 16.8154−42.7009 19.9926
CBSA=41860 San Francisco
Futures −4.6960 5.0612−17.3298 12.8699
Past CSI−12.2505 12.5798−32.3214 6.2524
Past FHFA −3.7273 5.3107 −9.9900 8.1000
Time Series −9.6472 23.1448−66.1301 30.5781
CBSA=47900 Washington
Futures −3.3486 3.6889−10.6316 6.7367
Past CSI −8.4485 7.6645−19.5970 9.2226
Past FHFA −3.8395 7.5117−13.7100 13.9700
Time Series −6.9899 14.0464−28.1107 29.8525
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TABLE 3.3. Pearson Correlation Coeffients between Housing Expectations from Futures
and other Proxies
CBSA Past CSI Past FHFATime Series
14460 −0.2946 0.0568 −0.3945
(0.0522) (0.7144) (0.0081)
16980 0.3189 0.2267 0.3061
(0.0348) (0.1389) (0.0433)
19740 0.2142 0.2909 −0.0256
(0.1626) (0.0554) (0.8692)
29820 −0.2170 −0.1431 −0.1058
(0.1571) (0.3541) (0.4942)
31100 0.6279 0.5664 0.6907
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000)
33100 0.1331 −0.1433 0.5612
(0.3892) (0.3535) (0.0001)
35620 0.7036 0.6560 0.7080
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
41740 0.5169 0.4820 0.7094
(0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0000)
41860 −0.0323 0.0935 0.0203
(0.8352) (0.5459) (0.8958)
47900 0.0599 −0.0459 −0.0234
(0.6994) (0.7673) (0.8800)
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a semi-parametric technique that does not require choosing a specific probability
distribution of the survival time, and is considered a more robust approach.
The model specification is as in (3.1), where h(t) is the hazard function of de-
fault and λ0(t) is called the baseline hazard function. The explanatory variables
in X include both static variables which are obtained at origination and time-
varying variables which are updated quarterly. The event of interest is default,
with prepayment as the competing risk.
h(t,X) = λ0(t) exp(Xβ) (3.1)
3.3.2 Housing Expectations and Default
In making the decision to default, borrowers weigh the benefit of keeping the house
versus the cost of making the mortgage payments. Expected house prices play a
central role in the valuation process. On the one side, the value of house to the
borrower includes the expected future house price. On the other side, as Kau
and Kim (1994) and Kau et al. (1994) noted, the cost of the mortgage payments
to the borrower needs to take into consideration the value of the future default
option. This future default option value is affected by the expected future house
price. Foote et al. (2008) used a two time period model to illustrate that higher
expectations of future house prices reduce the incentive to default even in face
of current negative equity since borrowers are in hope of market recovery in the
future, which may bring them to positive equity.
Despite of the importance of housing expectations, the existing proxies are
mainly model based and backward-looking in nature. In a normal housing market
when housing prices are relatively predictable, these measures might work well.
However, in the recent housing market, those model based measures performed
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poorly in forecasting housing price movements (Goetzmann et al., 2009). Also,
since model based measures rely solely on past price information, the same vari-
able such as past year appreciation may represent both the past market condition
and expectation, which makes it difficult to disentangle the two effects.
We first compare the regression results with different proxies of housing expecta-
tions. Table 3.4 reports the coefficient estimates, with the state clustered standard
error in the parenthesis. The first regression has expectations inferred from trans-
action prices of futures. The second uses the past year appreciation of CSI. The
third one uses the past year appreciation from FHFA and the last one uses the
one-year time series forecasts of housing appreciation from the ARIMA models.
The results show that futures behave differently from other proxies. First, from
the model fit perspective, futures yield the highest model fit as measured by -2lnL
among four different proxies. This indicates that futures might capture the true
expectations better than other proxies. Second, coefficients of futures and time
series have negative signs which suggest that higher housing expectations lower
the probability of default, while both measures of past appreciation have positive
signs. Futures also have the largest magnitude estimates. Third, as for statisti-
cal significance, only futures are significant at the one percent significance level. In
sum, futures are the only measure that shows that higher housing expectations sig-
nificantly reduce the default propensity as predicted by theory. The overall results
suggest that different proxies could lead to quite different inferences concerning
the role of housing expectations. Although inaccurate proxies may indicate that
housing expectations do not play an important role in default decisions, futures
seem to conform more closely to our prior beliefs.
From futures estimation as in Table 3.4, a one percent increase in housing ex-
pectation decreases the hazard of default by 1.32 percent (exp (−0.0133 · 1)− 1 =
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TABLE 3.4. Different Proxies for Housing Expectations
Futures Past CSI Past FHFA Time Series
Expectation −0.0133∗∗ 0.0020 0.0076 −0.0018
(0.0040) (0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0012)
CLTV 0.0229∗∗ 0.0228∗∗ 0.0238∗∗ 0.0218∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0015) (0.0022)
PiggyBack 0.5780∗∗ 0.5771∗∗ 0.5759∗∗ 0.5778∗∗
(0.0380) (0.0393) (0.0387) (0.0398)
Interest 0.0749∗∗ 0.0744∗∗ 0.0737∗∗ 0.0753∗∗
(0.0079) (0.0075) (0.0073) (0.0080)
FICO −0.7787∗∗ −0.7741∗∗ −0.7742∗∗ −0.7765∗∗
(0.0406) (0.0421) (0.0426) (0.0428)
FullDoc −0.3856∗∗ −0.3926∗∗ −0.3976∗∗ −0.3865∗∗
(0.0466) (0.0505) (0.0481) (0.0475)
ExoticARM 0.5439∗∗ 0.5464∗∗ 0.5372∗∗ 0.5499∗∗
(0.0418) (0.0453) (0.0462) (0.0432)
HybridARM 0.5855∗∗ 0.5803∗∗ 0.5680∗∗ 0.5876∗∗
(0.0238) (0.0265) (0.0263) (0.0237)
ExoticFRM 0.2199∗∗ 0.2231∗∗ 0.2200∗∗ 0.2248∗∗
(0.0490) (0.0495) (0.0500) (0.0486)
RegARM 0.3725∗∗ 0.3635∗∗ 0.3563∗∗ 0.3717∗∗
(0.0652) (0.0627) (0.0668) (0.0643)
Investor 0.0851 0.0778 0.0818 0.0741
(0.0470) (0.0495) (0.0492) (0.0480)
Purchase −0.0066 −0.0054 −0.0114 0.0009
(0.0189) (0.0184) (0.0151) (0.0204)
LoanAmount 0.0004 0.0024 0.0023 0.0020
(0.0056) (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0038)
LoanAge −0.4098∗∗ −0.4272∗∗ −0.4354∗∗ −0.4339∗∗
(0.0246) (0.0208) (0.0202) (0.0190)
PrepayPenalty 0.0215 0.0370 0.0454 0.0270
(0.0491) (0.0455) (0.0434) (0.0500)
RateDiff −0.1784∗∗ −0.1799∗∗ −0.1594∗∗ −0.1891∗∗
(0.0589) (0.0552) (0.0588) (0.0544)
Lag Unemployment −0.1809∗∗ −0.1817∗∗ −0.1777∗∗ −0.1803∗∗
(0.0349) (0.0385) (0.0381) (0.0392)
Income −0.3858∗∗ −0.4094∗∗ −0.4186∗∗ −0.4032∗∗
(0.0651) (0.0676) (0.0689) (0.0664)
-2lnL 1623539 1623892 1623747 1623826
∗∗ p < 0.01
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−1.32%). An expected one percent decrease in housing expectation increases the
hazard of default by 1.34 percent (exp (−0.0133 · −1)−1 = 1.34%). Given the pes-
simistic outlook of housing market, this indicates that the current large number
of defaults might be partly due to strategic default which is caused by not only
negative equity but also the low expectation of future housing prices.
Other variables have the expected signs. Higher current loan-to-value ratio, hav-
ing a second lien, and a higher interest rate lead to higher propensity to default.
Higher Fico scores and full documentation decrease the propensity to default.
Various exotic loans increase the propensity to default relative to the fully amor-
tized fixed rate mortgages. Seasoned loans have a lower probability of default.
Macroeconomic conditions such as the lagged unemployment also affect the loan
performances. Neighborhoods with higher incomes have lower default rates.
3.3.3 Robustness Checks
Next we conduct various robustness checks by including year and/or state dum-
mies to capture temporal and/or state fixed effects. Other variables and model
specifications are the same as in Table 3.4. Table 3.5 reports the regression results.
For simplicity, we only report the estimates of housing expectations. Panel A re-
gressions include only annual dichotomous variables. Panel B regressions include
only the state dichotomous variables and Panel C regressions include both state
and year dichotomous variables. Across different specifications, futures consistently
have a better model fit and the coefficients are significant and negative. Past CSI
and past FHFA have mixed signs and remain insignificant. When year dummies are
included, time series forecasts become significantly negative, but turn insignificant
as state dummies are added in the regression.
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TABLE 3.5. Robustness Checks
Futures Past CSI Past FHFA Time Series
Panel A Year Dummies Included
Expectation −0.0195∗∗ −0.0013 0.0049 −0.0039∗∗
(0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0014)
-2lnL 1622616 1623286 1623216 1623076
Panel B State Dummies Included
Expectation −0.0072∗∗ −0.0058 −0.0035 −0.0020
(0.0028) (0.0036) (0.0057) (0.0015)
-2lnL 1621696 1621756 1621759 1621731
Panel C Year and State Dummies Included
Expectation −0.0121∗∗ −0.0095 −0.0129 −0.0030
(0.0045) (0.0067) (0.0111) (0.0014)
-2lnL 1619962 1620111 1619982 1620095
∗∗ p < 0.01
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3.3.4 Information Content in Futures
In this section, we investigate the information content of futures. In Table 3.6, ex-
cept for expectations variables, we use the same model specifications as the regres-
sions in Table 3.4. For the expectations variables, each regression includes futures
and some other proxies to study whether futures contain additional information
besides the past housing appreciations. The results show that both coefficients and
standard error estimates of futures are very consistent and stable across various
specifications. The coefficients are negative and significant even after controlling for
various combinations of past price information. This indicates that futures contain
information that are not reflected in the past housing prices, which is not surpris-
ing since individuals use all the available information to form their expectations,
not just past prices.
TABLE 3.6. Combination of Forecasts in Regression
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Futures −0.0148∗∗ −0.0145∗∗ −0.0132∗∗ −0.0141∗∗ −0.0130∗∗ −0.0130∗∗ −0.0130∗∗
(0.0041) (0.0038) (0.0045) (0.0034) (0.0046) (0.0040) (0.0041)
Past CSI 0.0049 −0.0025 0.0099 0.0018
(0.0029) (0.0063) (0.0077) (0.0116)
Past FHFA 0.0092∗∗ 0.0111 0.0106 0.0096
(0.0036) (0.0066) (0.0049) (0.0070)
Time Series −0.0001 −0.0032 −0.0017 −0.0021
(0.0015) (0.0034) (0.0017) (0.0036)
-2lnL 1623479 1623360 1623539 1623352 1623415 1623330 1623328
∗∗ p < 0.01
3.4 Conclusion
Housing price expectations play a role in borrower mortgage default decisions.
However, because of the difficulty of obtaining a good proxy, prior mortgage re-
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search either does not include the housing expectations in the empirical work or
uses a past price based approach.
This paper proposes to use information of housing futures contracts as an alter-
native proxy since the transaction prices incorporate expectations for future house
prices. As an example, we compare the performances of four different proxies for
expectations in explaining borrower mortgage default behavior. The results show
that the futures based proxy outperforms other measures by having the highest
regression model fit as well as being the only measure that shows a significant effect
in the correct direction on mortgage default behavior. The results also show that
futures contain additional information that is not contained in the past housing
prices.
Since housing expectations may affect various real estate issues such as mortgage
credit supply, housing demand and housing supply, the use of futures may help
these other research areas.
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